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The ambivalent politicisation of European communication 
Genesis of the controversies and institutional frictions surrounding the 2006 White Paper 
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Senior Researchers – Centre for European Political Sociology (GSPE) 
Translated from French by Emmanuel Kobena Kuto, Jesse Tatum & Jean-Yves Bart. 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article analyses the political stakes of the EU’s communication policy. The authors 
study the frictions between European institutions, mainly the Commission and 
Parliament, after the publication of the White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy, replacing them in the context of the representations, routines, and compromises 
that have historically structured the interinstitutional relationships about communication. 
This historical perspective enables them to show the long lasting and persistent of the 
European actors’ attention to the promotion of Europe, as well as the strength of logics of 
compromise on the politicisation of European communication.   
 
Keywords: European communication, EU, White Paper, European public space. 
 
Résumé : 
Cet article analyse les enjeux politiques qui traversent aujourd’hui l’Union européenne 
concernant sa politique de communication. Les auteurs étudient  les frictions qui ont 
opposé les institutions européennes, principalement la Commission et le Parlement, à 
l’occasion de la publication du Livre blanc sur une politique de communication 
européenne, en les replaçant  plus largement dans les  représentations, les routines et les 
compromis qui structurent historiquement les relations interinstitutionnelles autour de la 
communication. Cette perspective historique leur permet de montrer non seulement 
l’antériorité et la persistance du souci des acteurs européens à promouvoir l’Europe, mais 
aussi la force des logiques de compromis sur la politisation de la communication 
européenne. 
 
Mots-clés : Communication européenne, UE, Livre blanc, Espace public européen. 
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“Public relations are an independent 
complement of the general information 
activity. It is clear that they both deserve 
maximum attention from both the 
European Commission and the European 
Parliament in the absence of which the 
Communities would exist exclusively at 
the intergovernmental level and end up 
speaking a language understood only by a 
small group of insiders; a ‘volapük’ for 
stateless technocrats and not a human 
language” 
 
~European Parliament Political 
Committee report on the information 
policy of European Communities 
(January 1972). 
 
 
If the Union wishes to be listened to, it 
has to take European affairs to national, 
regional, and local level. However, it is 
not sensible to view citizens as the prime 
movers of participation and dialogue. It 
would be pointless to listen carefully to 
what citizens had to say if they were ill-
informed. 
 
~Report of the Committee on 
Culture and Education of the European 
Parliament on the White Paper on a 
European communication policy (October 
2006). 
 
Published at the height of the crisis 
triggered in the spring of 2005 by the 
rejection of the constitutional treaty in 
France and the Netherlands, the recent 
White Paper issued by the Commission 
on European Union communication1 
gave rise to surprisingly bitter exchanges 
between the institutions of the Union, 
quite unlike the “culture of consensus” 
that is usually associated with 
Community institutions (Abélès/Bellier 
1996). Although the Commission issues 
numerous White Papers, they hardly 
have anything in common. Unlike the 
very first of its kind2 issued by the 
Commission which made a triumphant 
début, the political outcome of this 
White Paper was less glorious. 
Immediately after its publication, the 
proposals of the Commission contained 
therein rekindled the enduring 
controversy over the objectives and 
means of European Community 
                                                
1 European Commission, White Paper on a 
European communication policy, Luxembourg, 
OPCE, 2006 [COM (2006) 35 final]. The 
Commission specifies on its site that “White 
papers are documents containing proposals for 
Community action in a specific area. They 
sometimes follow a green paper published to 
launch a consultation process at European level. 
While green papers set out a range of ideas 
presented for public discussion and debate, white 
papers contain an official set of proposals in 
specific policy areas and are used as vehicles for 
their development.” 
2 Concerning the first White Paper on the 
economic and monetary union, see Drake 2002. 
For a personal account, refer to the chapter titled 
“Le livre blanc de 1993 ou la dernière chance” in 
Jacques Delors’s Mémoires (p. 416sq). 
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communication.3 However, the issue 
went beyond the endless debate over the 
technical diagnostic of the problem 
which had raged back and forth for 
nearly two decades. This time around, 
the major institutions of the Union not 
only disagreed sharply but also disagreed 
publicly. If the inter-institutional 
disagreement alternately took on aspects 
of the quarrel over “good law” 
(concerning the “legal basis” of the 
communication policy), of the experts’ 
debate over the proper means and of the 
political argument over the proper 
message, it also drifted into trivial 
bargaining over the distribution of 
resources allocated to European 
communication. The controversy over 
the common communication policy, 
which resurfaced between the summer of 
2005 and autumn 2007, brought into the 
open the remarkable extent to which the 
report was dramatised in Community 
circles. Additionally, it showed that the 
explosive disavowal of the draft 
constitution (the 2005 “no” vote) 
happened before the cycle of 
institutional re-balancing triggered by 
the resignation of the Santer 
Commission could be completed and, 
also, before the Commission could re-
establish its leadership over issues that 
traditionally fell within its jurisdiction. 
Having hosted since its creation the 
European common information service, 
which has since become an integral part 
of its administration (the Directorate-
                                                
3 As early as the tortuous ratification of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, the media observed that 
accusing fingers were pointed at the 
communications department in community 
circles. An article titled Espace européen: les 
mal-aimés de Bruxelles (the European Zone: the 
unpopular figures of Brussels) published in the 
13 October 1992 issue of the newspaper Le 
Monde reads: “There was near-unanimous 
criticism of the DG-X, a major publisher of 
brochures extolling the virtues of the Community 
which were generously distributed to visitors but 
whose impact on the masses was very limited”. 
General of Information, see below), the 
Commission has in effect traditionally 
played the roles of initiator, coordinator 
and manager of Community 
communication within the European 
institutional game, deploying its human 
and financial resources in the service of 
European politicians and their “partners” 
(mainly the European Parliament). 
However, the proposals advanced by the 
Commission in the White Paper, which 
seeks to replace routines with functional 
arrangements,4 drew opposition from 
MEPs5 and drew the attention of 
representatives of governmental interests 
(COREPER, General Secretariat of the 
Council). The direction and scope of the 
Commission’s proposals following the 
cycle of reactions from the major 
institutional partners6 are a step 
backwards in this regard, since they were 
aimed more at consolidating the well-
oiled practices among the said partners 
than formally defining new ones. The 
nature of the bargain around the White 
Paper and, in the long run, the fact that 
the Commission abandoned its major 
proposals is therefore indicative of a new 
balance of power within the European 
institutional game. 
 
It is therefore evident that what 
happened between June 2005 and 
October 2007 can be better understood 
by retracing the communication policy 
design component of EU history. Indeed, 
it is a long way from the initial 
                                                
4 In the White Paper, the Commission proposed 
to define a legal base for the communication 
policy of the EU and to formally declare it a 
common policy (see below). 
5 In many respects, the Herrero report ratified by 
the Parliament in October 2006 marks the 
rejection of the WPC by MEPs. 
6 In accordance with tradition, the answers to the 
White Paper by the institutions (Parliament, 
Council) and the organs (CESE, regional 
committees) resulted in the Commission 
publishing new follow-up proposals early 
October, 2007 (see below). 
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structuring of administrative services 
devolved to information and press 
relations, to the appointment of Margot 
Wallström as vice-president of the 
Commission in charge of “inter-
institutional relations and 
communication strategy”. Over the past 
forty years, the project of constructing 
Europe has changed in scale and nature. 
Meanwhile, communication has become 
a major stake on which the foremost 
responsibility of battling abstention 
during European elections hinges, 
legitimising EU policy and enhancing its 
image in the public opinions of member 
countries. The bitterness of inter-
institutional exchanges is first and 
foremost due to the paradigm shift on the 
problem of communication within 
Community circles. This problem is no 
longer considered in terms of 
communication by “teaching Europe”, 
but more as the obligation to urgently 
and efficiently generate (mass) support, 
(citizen) consent and (electoral) 
participation at the same time. The issue 
of the debate initiated between Union 
institutions by the White Paper is 
therefore nothing less than a dismantling 
of the orientation and the control of 
Community communication means, 
which appear today as the main 
instrument of legitimising a peculiar 
power, devoid of the traditional 
attributes of political incarnation (its 
own territory, a single decision-making 
centre, administrative machinery or deep 
electoral roots at the local level).7  It is 
this chronic politicisation of European 
communication - thwarted and 
euphemised by institutional economics 
and its relational routines - which 
revealed the process of institutional 
                                                
7 On the legitimity of the EU, see 
Banchoff/Smith 1999. This analysis of the 
“European power”, in point of fact, echoes the 
theorist view of democracy. On these two 
dimensions – social and procedural – of 
legitimity, see de Búrca 1996. 
exchanges caused by the publication of 
the White Paper.  
 
By revisiting the genesis of the unrest 
the White Paper caused in the 
institutional game, this article intends to 
move away from the traditional 
normative approach (Why does Europe 
communicate so poorly and how can it 
be improved?)8 in order to examine how 
the issue of “European communication” 
gradually evolved from a sectoral and 
marginal situation to an inter-sectoral 
and important issue. Like other cases 
caught in the interpenetrated geometries 
of Community power, communication 
has always been the subject of 
accommodation between the competing 
logics of the institutions and the political 
constraints of compromise. Therefore, 
this article will demonstrate that the 
paradigmatic frameworks9 of this 
arrangement are still being fashioned and 
modified to suit the configurations of the 
internal and external power game of the 
Union.10 
                                                
8 A critical evaluation of the communication 
strategy of the EU inspired several works. From 
the social sciences point of view, see Dacheux 
1997 ; 2003. Reflexive accounts of European 
institution actors engaged in EU communication 
can be found in CEES 2007.  
9 By “paradigmatic framework”, we mean 
orders of signification, certainties, concepts 
that constitute the “culture” of European actors. 
The approach is not psychological, but merely 
aims (P. Veyne, N. Elias) to identify the 
imaginary “frames” which guide organised 
action and are apparent in the lines of action 
(“policies”, “strategy”, “action plan”) and the 
spaces of justifications that collective actors 
apply to themselves and demonstrate publicly. 
Furthermore, “frame perspective” considers 
how these frames play a role in forecasting, 
diagnosing and justifying common principles 
of action. Concerning these roles, see 
Benford/Snow 2000. 
10 This article draws from two main sources: 
firstly, a systematic prospecting in the archives 
of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament; secondly, interviews conducted in 
Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris and Berlin with the 
protagonists of the EU communication policy. 
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 (1) Teaching Europe as 
communication common sense: 
The avatars of the diffusionist 
paradigm 
  
The progressive extension of the 
domains of intervention of 
Community communication  
 
The actors who manage the 
Commission, i.e., the college of 
commissioners and senior European civil 
servants, who traditionally speak in the 
name of “Europe”, quickly showed the 
importance they attach to the supply of 
information to the public in Member 
States. Traditionally governed by the 
communicational practices of the day, 
the communication policy of the 
Commission initially drew from the 
time-tested techniques of public relations 
and press relations.11 Mass 
communication practices were however 
incorporated into the package in the late 
1980s. Initially, media visibility of 
Community institutions and their 
activities seem to have dominated the 
issue of the relationship with public 
opinion. As early as 1950, Brussels 
hosted press and information 
departments which sponsored the early 
opinion polls on attitudes towards the 
Europe of Six in the founding states. The 
intention at the time was to establish 
contacts within two circles: the media; 
and what was then referred to as “return 
information”, which consisted of media 
monitoring and opinion surveys. Over 
the years, these units matured together 
with the Commission, thus extending 
both the scope and the means of its 
action. Although the Single European 
                                                
11 Regarding the creation of a common 
information and spokesperson service, see Rabier 
1993; as well as Bastin 2003.  
Act boosted the integration process at 
the level of state-to-state and 
Commission-state relations, it also 
strengthened the influence of the 
Commission within the Community 
institutional game. 
 
This rise in the power of the 
Commission resulted in the creation of a 
reactive and efficient communication 
machinery, notably for opinion studies12, 
media monitoring and campaigns 
directed at the general public. Thus in 
the late 1980s, the Commission either 
organised or supported several events in 
the area of sports (European Sailing 
Championship, CE Future Tour, 
European championships) and culture 
(1988 Brisbane Exhibition followed by 
the 1992 Seville Exposition) aimed at 
“sensitising” the general public to 
Europe. Additionally, a series of 
“specific campaigns” were launched in 
1986, culminating in the declaration of 
1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively as 
European Year of Road Safety, 
Environment and the Fight Against 
Cancer. Although the Commission still 
placed emphasis on “information effort” 
and “public relations”, European 
communication actors began to develop 
more marketing-oriented actions.13 In 
1989, the Luxembourg national Jean 
Dondeliner, Commissioner in charge of 
Cultural and Audiovisual Affairs, as well 
as of Information, re-oriented the new 
Priority Information Program. As a 
                                                
12 The biannual standard Eurobarometers 
(questions on opinion “trends”) have been 
published since 1974. The more flexible and 
more targeted Flash Eurobarometers were 
launched in the early 1990s. 
13 In a memorandum on the activity of the 
Commission in the area of information-
communication, Anna Melich, then 
administrator of DG Information, 
Communication, Culture, presented these 
“marketing” actions as “informative spaces 
based on current needs and instituted them 
depending on circumstances” (Melich 1989).  
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result, the DG-X was able, on the one 
hand, to establish “information and 
communication guidelines” among the 
various units concerned, leading to better 
“coherence of resources” in relevant 
matters; and, on the other hand, the 
Commission defined “the most 
important and most appropriate 
Community issues”, and determined the 
use of resources “depending on the 
Member State and the targets”.14 
Contrary to the retrospective vision 
which considers the very controversial 
de-Clercq report15 (1993) as the 
beginning of awareness to 
communication within the College and 
administration in Brussels, it is clear that 
issues related to the information and 
sensitisation of the general public about 
Europe were major considerations as far 
back as the first term of Delors. 
 
In spite of preconceptions, an objective 
look at the communication machinery of 
the Commission can lead to consider as 
excessive, or even unjustifiable, the 
perpetual retooling of this 
communication policy. The Berlaymont 
Press Centre, located in the headquarters 
of the Commission, hosts a sizeable 
proportion of the one thousand or so 
accredited journalists from all over the 
world who hold daily briefings – 
                                                
14 European Commission, Priority Information 
Program 1989 – Operational Orientations, 1989 
(SEC(89)367/3). 
15 In 1992, the Commission appointed a group of 
experts made up of actors from various 
professional horizons (journalists, academics, 
artistes, advertisers, and national and European 
civil servants), and led by Belgian MEP Willy 
de-Clercq. The group was charged with a triple 
mission: “establish a descriptive state of 
information and communication policies”; 
“deliver a diagnostic on the quality of 
arrangements, actions, attitudes and means”; and 
“make strategic recommendations”. In spite of 
the quality and extent of the elements of analysis 
in the group’s final report, the de-Clercq report 
was sharply criticised for referring to the Union 
as a “good product” (see de-Clercq 1993).  
referred to as “midday rendezvous” – 
with the spokespersons of the various 
directorate-generals of the Commission. 
Within the framework of its press 
relations, the Commission also regularly 
invited to Brussels, at its cost, journalists 
from the local press of the Member 
States in order to explain to them the 
work of the EU. “Europe” was equally 
present in each country16 through the 
official representation of the 
Commission in all Member States. 
Informative literature on the history of 
the EU published by the Commission, 
e.g., its actions and various programs, 
are accessible on the premises of the 
various institutional partners like the 
Europe Information Centre, Europe 
Houses, public libraries, and Chambers 
of Commerce, which serve as its official 
relays; in addition to the role played by 
its own representatives and networks in 
the Member States17 with regard to 
information. Since 1999, the 
Commission has its own website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/). Redesigned in 
2003, it offers European citizens a 
stream of information on the political 
agenda of the EU, the Commissioners’ 
work as well as easy access to a 
significant amount of EU archives (e.g., 
legislative texts, reports, programs, 
organisational charts, forms, EU annual 
activity reports). For several years now, 
this electronic portal has been hosting 
interactive systems which enable 
European citizens to directly contact 
“Europe” in order to ask questions (the 
Euro Direct telephone and electronic 
contact centre). Furthermore, “Europe” 
has also become a brand: the 
Commission’s logo appears on all 
                                                
16  The Commission has an official representation 
in each member state (sometimes two, as in 
France and Germany). The staffs of these 
representations are under the Directorate-General 
of the commission in charge of communication. 
17  Close to seven hundred relays and networks 
including the four hundred new Europe Direct 
information relays opened in 2005. 
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programs, aid or construction projects 
for which it provides financial 
assistance; and on beneficiary partner 
sites like governmental and think tank 
portals. These form just a part of the 
communication arsenal that the 
Commission possesses. 
 
Following the massive abstention in the 
European elections of 2004 and the “no” 
vote to the constitutional treaty the 
following year, the Commission first 
responded with a program of 
consultation of European citizens aimed 
at understanding their expectations and 
opinions which, in turn, would inform a 
new communication policy.18 A few 
months later, the Commission offered to 
organise the entire communication 
apparatus more formally and 
systematically under its own structures. 
For various reasons, however, these 
initiatives met with stiff opposition from 
different quarters, especially from the 
other institutions of the institutional 
triangle (Parliament and Council) which 
had their own information and 
communication departments; and 
subsequently from the various 
directorate-generals of the Commission 
which, since the 1970s, have each 
progressively set up a communications 
unit directed towards specialised 
audiences of their policy domain 
(Joana/Smith 2000). They all questioned 
not only the attempts to centralise 
control and the means of Community 
communication within the Commission, 
but also its right to single-handedly 
manage the communication of the 
Union. Finally, they questioned the right 
of the Commission to speak on behalf of 
“Europe”19. This resistance and these 
                                                
18 European Commission, The Commission’s 
Contribution to the Period of Reflection and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate, Luxembourg, OPCE, 2005. 
19 The role of the spokesperson - defined as the 
recognition of the authority to speak on behalf of 
criticisms signalled the end of the 
undisputed leadership of the 
Commission earned in the 1980s and 
1990s. This situation results mostly from 
the increasing politicisation of the 
relationships between EU institutions 
(linked to the extension of the scope of 
the Community’s action), correlative of 
a misalignment of political interests, 
among which those of Parliament and 
the Commission. In 2006, there was no 
longer a single self-evident approach of 
European communication, as in the past 
when the focus was on promoting the 
European “great idea”, explaining its 
lines of action and legitimising its 
institutions. The follow-up to the White 
Paper points to the ambiguities of the 
process of politicisation of Community 
communication, both driven by the 
imperative of legitimisation introduced 
with the electoral trial and subdued by 
the logics of government by compromise 
specific to the EU (see Smith 2002 on 
this point). Imperceptibly, the long-
standing principles of tacit institutional 
agreement linking the Parliament to the 
Commission’s orientations have 
degenerated over recent years into 
systematic criticism of the College’s 
choices and proposals on the part of 
MEPs. Thus, in a follow-up text to the 
White Paper published in January 2007, 
this separation is described and justified 
in the following terms: 
 
Over the years, the European Parliament 
has critically examined the Commission's 
proposals in the field of communication. 
As the representative of the interests of 
Europe's citizens, it also itself has a duty 
to communicate what Europe is about and 
to articulate and act upon citizens' 
                                                
Europe (and therefore in effect embody all the 
actors and institutions of the Union) and the right 
to operate its symbols – results in the 
strengthening of the dominant position of the 
Commission. Concerning “the social technology 
of the delegation” and the effects of “ circular 
circulation of recognition”, see Bourdieu 2001.  
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interests in Europe. In its reports, 
Parliament has repeatedly made detailed 
proposals for improving the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens, although 
in many cases the Commission has only 
accepted them to a limited extent. As a 
result, Members of the European 
Parliament have become very critical of 
Commission initiatives. However, there is 
no dispute as to the fact that the EU's 
communications capacity needs to be 
significantly improved.20 
 
Tottering halfway between polemical 
posture and acceptance of needs, the 
ambivalence of these words at once 
indicates the political weight taken on by 
the Commission and its narrow leeway 
in a decision-making space, based on the 
initiative of the Commission; and, 
traditionally, the search for compromise. 
In order to make allowances for long 
structural transformations, permanent 
inter-institutional game and contextual 
effects, it is useful to reposition the 
mutation of communication issues 
within the historical plasticity of the 
European Community. While the 
progressive extension of the field of 
Community communication is the 
consequence of the changes in the 
institutional representations of the 
“public” following electoral trials, these 
changes do not only affect the 
improvement of the techniques and 
instruments of communication. By 
shifting from one paradigm to another, 
the rationalisation of communication – 
from policy of Community 
communication to Community policy of 
communication - is a process that upsets 
institutional routines by calling into 
question the original distribution of roles 
and competences. The centralisation of 
the Community policy of 
communication in favour of the 
Commission, which had started during 
                                                
20 Fact Sheet on communication policy, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4_16_7_e
n.htm. 
the Delors years, became more and more 
problematic as relationships within the 
European institutional game got 
increasingly politicised. 
 
 
The diffusionist paradigm, or the 
political blind spot of information on 
Europe. 
 
When the Joint Press and Information 
Service (SPI) was established in the 
early 1960s at the behest of the European 
Parliament,21 the European Project 
covered only six States and only 
involved – apart from the strategic 
production of steel and nuclear energy – 
the creation of a customs union among 
Member States by 1970. Although the 
rapid progression of this objective and 
the considerable increase in trade among 
the countries that signed the Rome 
Treaty bode well for enhanced political 
development that would eventually lead 
to prospects of confederacy, European 
communities still constituted an evolving 
legal architecture hinged on an 
embryonic administration. In the late 
1950s, the EEC Commission created a 
special department for its relations with 
journalists sent to cover its activity. This 
spokesperson department, the 
Communication and the Spokesperson’s 
Service (SPP), was soon structured 
around a system of accreditation 
whereby, in collaboration with 
journalists in Brussels, officials of the 
                                                
21 Considering that “the three European 
Communities were hatched from the same 
political idea and constitute the three 
differentiated elements of a unitary 
enlargement”, the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 
June 1958 adopted a resolution which 
recommended the establishment of three 
common services including a “press and 
information service” (JOCE, 26 July 1958). 
Difficult negotiations between the EEC, ECSC 
and Euratom prevented its establishment prior to 
1962.  
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SPP chose journalists authorised to 
attend the Commission’s press 
conferences (Bastin 2003). However, the 
exchange of information material on the 
Communities at the time was a reflection 
of the latter, given that it was legal in 
content and diplomatic in form. It 
attracted very little media interest in the 
respective States, thus making the 
European Agency22 the only media 
house providing complete and daily 
coverage of the Commission’s 
deliberations. 
 
From the Information Service to DG-COMM 
 
Successively known as Common Press and 
Information Service (1968-1967), Directorate- 
General of Press and Information (1967-1973), 
Directorate General of Press and communication 
or DG X (1973-1999), the administrative 
directorate in charge of communication affairs 
within the Commission in Brussels was also 
temporarily the seat of Culture. It was dissolved 
by the Prodi presidency in 1999 (its 
responsibilities were shared between the 
Education-Culture DG and the spokesperson 
unit) but was reconstituted in 2001 under the 
name of Directorate-General of communication 
or DG-COMM. This directorate-general 
traditionally managed relations with accredited 
media houses, the activity of representations in 
the Member States, partnership with information 
relays as well as coordinating the publishing of 
major information and communication 
documents on the activities of the EU. With 
close to one thousand employees in the twenty-
seven countries of the Union, the organisation 
and effectiveness of DG-COMM have been one 
of the main subjects of debate in each of the 
proposals – or other action plans – adopted by 
the Commission in the matter of EU 
“communication strategy” since 2001. 
 
  
                                                
22  Founded in Luxembourg in 1952 
immediately after the installation of the ECSC 
High Authority, Agence Europe moved to 
Brussels when the EEC Commission took office 
in 1958. It played the long-term role of a 
“European” press agency and of daily newsletter 
for “Brussels” information. 
Up until the 1970s, the Commission had 
no communication policy stricto sensu. 
The dominant perception within the 
European institution with regard to 
prospective issues of communication is 
embedded in what we shall refer to as 
the diffusionist paradigm based on two 
approaches to the problem: the 
“ballistic” approach, or choosing the 
correct channel; and the deficiency 
approach, or filling the EC knowledge 
gap. This translated into an information 
dissemination policy on, for example, 
“historical origins”, “the great missions” 
and the “initiatives” of the EU. Entrusted 
with this educational mission, the Press 
and Information DG, which is the 
section of EU administration in charge 
of these affairs, limited itself to 
publishing a surprisingly limited amount 
of copies of brochures (about a thousand 
at most), and sending memoranda to 
sections of the public such as trade 
unions and specialised press (Rabier 
1993) who are directly concerned with 
Community decisions. In 1972, MEPs 
adopted a report in which they severely 
criticised this concentration of 
communication towards “specific 
audiences”.23 In the report, the MEPs – 
who were then still delegated by the 
respective national parliaments – 
accused the Commission of neglecting 
the importance of communication as a 
channel for explaining the integration 
process to citizens and convincing them 
to accept this historic project. The 
rapporteur, Wilhelmus Schuijt, 
bemoaned the relative decrease in funds 
allocated to communication since the 
creation of a single Commission in 1958, 
and expressed concerns about 
interventionist tendencies in the 
financing of projects involving local 
                                                
23 Report of the political committee of the 
European Parliament on the information policy 
of European Communities known as the Schuijt 
Report, January 1972. 
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partners.24 In the face of this critical 
assessment of their activity, the 
Commissioner in charge of the 
Information portfolio, Albert Borschette 
and DG-X director, Jacques-René 
Rabier, defended this sectionalised 
approach to their mission, which we will 
refer to here as a public relations 
approach.  Indeed, the DG-X was split 
into specialised sections25 with the 
responsibility for drawing up 
information programs targeted at 
audiences identifiable mainly by 
occupation. The responsibility for 
publishing dossiers and brochures 
detailing Community provisions was 
given to external professionals who often 
turned out to be Brussels-based 
accredited journalists. Just like the 
diffusionist concept of the information 
missions pursued by the commission, 
this organisational model remained 
essentially unchanged until the 1980s. 
 
From Information Service to 
communication policy – facing the test 
of elections 
 
It was during the “Delors years”26 that a 
gradual change of approach emerged in 
the communicational practices of the 
Commission. This change was 
particularly due to the upscaling of the 
process of European integration, which 
considerably increased the 
Commissioners’ power of action and 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 22. 
25 As in 1971, the DG-X was composed of the 
following departments: Youth-Adult Education; 
University Affairs; Trade Unions; Economic and 
Social Information Group (the most well-
equipped in terms of staff); Agriculture; 
Industry-Energy-Scientific Research; 
Development Aid; Foreign Relations and Trade 
Policy. 
26 Jacques Delors was president of the European 
Commission from 1985 to 1995. For Delors’s 
push towards increasing the power of the 
Commission’s presidency, see Ross 1995. 
decision-making, thus concurrently 
transforming the conditions under which 
they exercised their mandate. This 
period marked the passage from an 
economic community, which was 
vigorously revitalised after the signing of 
the Single European Act in 1986, to the 
unprecedented monetary and political 
unification project launched with the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
 
During this transitional period, the role 
of the Commission became a central part 
of the political life of Europeans. 
Beyond the three hundred or so 
directives aimed at harmonising the 
internal market, the Commission 
emerged increasingly as the “European 
government”, taking on roles such as 
negotiating agreements with third 
countries, and reprimanding Member 
States that flouted EU regulations. This 
was especially the case after the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force, 
which substantially extended the 
European Union’s sphere of activity, 
especially by establishing jurisdiction in 
matters of consumer protection, health, 
research, environmental protection and 
immigration policy. 
 
The European Project of the 1990s was 
far more complex than that of the 1960s. 
It covered fifteen countries, forged an 
integrated policy in the areas mentioned 
above, and further developed 
intergovernmental cooperation in matters 
of foreign policy, common security and 
the judiciary. At the time, the 
Commission had over 15,000 
employees. Nearly 800 journalists from 
Europe and around the world were 
accredited to the Commission’s SPP. 
The mandate of the Commission became 
more political, leading to greater media 
exposure of their activity and therefore 
greater attention paid to their individual 
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and collective communication27. This 
politicisation of the Commission 
gradually changed the issues of EU 
communication policy. Although still 
orchestrated by the Commission through 
the SPP, this customary jurisdiction was 
subject to debate with the other 
institutions at the same time as the 
Commission. The result is the 
politicisation of the communication 
strategy. The diffusionist paradigm, 
which has always been dominant in the 
general approach to European 
communication, assumed a visibly 
strategic coloration. The pedagogic 
justification for informing “specific 
audiences” such as farmers, academics, 
and journalists gradually gave way to a 
persuasive communication discourse 
aimed at the general public or at “target 
audiences”. 
 
Historically, the beginning of the first 
shift in the institutional concept of 
European communication and its reality 
can be situated at the transition from the 
1980s to the 1990s. With the political 
revolution initiated by Maastricht, EU 
actors were no longer the artisans of a 
customs union, economic integration or 
harmonisation of standards of member 
countries only. They became the 
entrepreneurs of a model of regional 
democracy: a combination of 
supranational and intergovernmental 
decision-making bodies, which emerged 
as a frame of reference for political 
regulation, i.e., the level at which public 
problems are defined and solved in 
member countries. Beyond the powers 
delegated by the representatives of 
national populations and written into the 
treaty, the legitimacy of European 
authorities was henceforth to come from 
the consent of citizens. The decade 
                                                
27  After 1985, the commissioners were 
more than before key political figures, having 
already held ministerial positions in their 
countries. See Joana/Smith 2002 : 47-50. 
between the first European 
parliamentary elections with direct 
universal suffrage (from 1979), to the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992-1993), is therefore the first 
movement in a new phase of European 
enlargement in which the decisions of 
Brussels would be more systematically 
subjected to the vote and judgement 
(e.g., opinion polls) of the people. The 
support of citizens was now the primary 
condition for a building and decision-
making process hitherto confined to 
diplomatic circles, and to negotiations 
between executives of national 
administrations. By virtue of its scope, 
this new “democratic challenge” – as 
termed by the actors of these institutions 
– could only be overcome by means of 
relational communication sectionalised 
into public relations, media relations and 
lobbying, as well as confined to specific 
audiences. Resembling the governments 
of Member States, European Community 
institutions, especially the Commission, 
gradually interiorised the public’s 
demand for democracy,28 that is, a 
principle of legitimization based on a 
permanent link between policy and 
current public opinion. 
 
From 1985, the Delors College put the 
issue of communication on its list of 
priorities and worked towards greater 
media visibility of the EC by means of 
“appropriate and selective sensitisation 
campaigns in various European 
countries”.29 Following this new and 
broadly advertised approach to solving 
                                                
28 The notion was borrowed from Bernard Manin 
who divides democracy into three successive 
ages, namely “parliamentary government”, 
“party democracy” and “democracy of the 
public”. The last age is characterised by 
personalisation of electoral choice, instability of 
political preferences and the weight of public 
opinion. See Manin 1995: 279sq.  
29 European Commission, Orientations and 
objectives 1985-1988 of the information and 
communication policy of the Commission, 1985.  
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the problem, MEPs adopted a report the 
following year which declared that the 
institutions must “resort to the most 
appropriate means of communication- 
audiovisual, press, posters, 
advertisement”.30 Both in the MEPs’ 
report and the Commissioners’ 
orientations, communication was defined 
as a distinct entity from information, the 
strategic association of a message and a 
dissemination technology capable of 
influencing citizens. 
 
“There is an information policy on 
Community policies. However it does not 
convey messages, only news. (…) 
Parliament is a symbol, and symbols that 
fail always attract negative feelings. That 
is why Parliament has the political 
obligation to commit the States of the 
Community to a policy of European 
communication within which not only all 
national institutions but above all 
Community institutions are able to 
express their meaning. (…) an 
information policy designed without a 
communication policy is a policy without 
raison d’être. No symbolic celebration, no 
festival, no prize, no sporting tournament 
can fill the political vacuum created by 
the failure of the political idea and 
structures of the Community.”31 
 
It is during the 1980s that the perspective 
of the dominant institutional approach 
would change due to the test of universal 
suffrage and the increasing criticism of 
the “democratic deficit”32 to which the 
EU was subjected. However, essentially, 
the change was limited to applying 
advertising techniques to EU 
institutional communication, as the “92 
market” programme, managed by DG-X 
and meant to promote the Single Market, 
shows (Tumber 1995). The shift from an 
                                                
30 European Parliament, Report on the 
communication policy of the European 
community (rapporteur: Gianni Baget Bozzo), 
1986 (A 2-111/86). 
31 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
32 David Marquand first used the expression 
(Marquand 1979). 
information policy designed to build to a 
communication policy designed to 
persuade is only an adjustment of the 
response model to the problem within 
the limits of the diffusionist paradigm. 
The issue therefore was to find remedies 
to the loopholes, vacuums and failures 
by associating the professionalized 
techniques of strategically generating 
and disseminating messages and those of 
the “information effort”. The original 
education-communication model now 
doubles with a persuasion-
communication model. Henceforth, the 
figures of the general public and opinion 
are part of the institutional language and 
vision of the problem, and explicitly 
constitute a “target” to be won over 
using the recipes of mass communication 
and marketing.33 
 
De-sectorisation and prioritisation of 
EU communication. 
 
With the accelerated Europeanisation of 
the political horizon of EU countries in 
the early 1990s, the leaders of the 
Commission, including MEPs, took a 
second look at the political role played 
by the information and communication 
work of the EU. The advent of European 
citizenship34 would compel and 
authorise the Commission – even as the 
Member States were still suspicious of 
“propaganda” from another authority 
towards their own citizens – to 
                                                
33 This shift towards professional communication 
is not specific to the Commission and can also be 
observed in various national governments in 
Europe. 
34 “European citizenship” was created by the 
Maastricht Treaty (art. 8) in 1992, and sanctions 
the following rights: freedom of movement; right 
to vote and eligibility to stand for the Parliament 
in Strasbourg; right to vote and eligibility to 
stand for municipal elections; right to petition 
Parliament; and diplomatic protection from a 
Member State if one’s State has no 
representation in a third State.  
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reconsider the organisational modalities, 
means and objectives assigned to 
officials in charge of directing EU 
communication. If the de-Clercq report35 
stands for anything at all, it is surely the 
beginning of the assumed use of the 
instruments of communication within 
Community institutions. The general 
approach to the problem remained 
diffusionist, that is, deficient in 
conception and ballistic in 
implementation. Nevertheless, 
communication was now taken for what 
it is: an artificiality of institutional pose 
and discourse cleverly presented to the 
public as natural.36 Consequently, 
communication towards the “general 
public” was considered as the weak 
point of European enlargement. 
Consequently, it became a veritable 
obsession, regularly revisited by the 
major EU actors in inter-institutional 
debates, reports and political forums in 
the media. The conversion to, as well as 
the faith in the power of communication 
were such that reference to it gradually 
innervated the publicising of the major 
Community policies, such as presence of 
logos, single graphic charters for all 
communication supports, and 
standardisation of message. The opinion 
surveys sponsored by the Commission 
identified “sections of the public” who 
were less Europhile than others, namely 
young people, women and people with 
lower levels of education.37 In the face 
                                                
35 de-Clercq Report, op. cit. 
36 Dominique Memmi analysed the work of 
advisors on political communication from the 
perspective of “maieutics of power”, or working 
to “naturalise” domination, especially by “the 
pedagogy of poses” (Memmi 1991).  
37 This institutional reading by diverse Europhile 
“segments of the public” is supported by a 
scholarly theorisation of which Ronald Inglehart, 
a close associate of the administrative executives 
of the DG-X, (notably Jacques-René Rabier, 
founder of Eurobarometer) was an influential 
figurehead in the 1970s and the 1980s. On these 
sociological theorisations of membership in 
Europe, see Belot 2002.  
of this problem, communicational 
dialectics provided a solution in that it 
adjusts the message and the language to 
these “target audiences”, with the view 
to “selling” Europe as the de-Clercq 
report explicitly recommended as early 
as 1993. It was no longer only a question 
of designing a program for education 
about Europe by informing “specific 
audiences” (Schuijt report, 1979), nor 
one of communication based on the 
emotional force of symbols (Baget-
Bozzo report, 1986). According to the 
rhetoric of targeting borrowed from 
commercial marketing, the point was to 
draw up messages and mediatisation 
mechanisms that would help reach 
indifferent and ill-informed audiences. It 
is in this light that the development of a 
Community audiovisual policy, the 
increase of aid for training and education 
and the information programs should be 
understood (Eugène 2005). As early as 
this period, the limited press coverage of 
European affairs and the absence of 
genuinely transnational media led to 
move beyond a model of public 
communication where the media are the 
prevalent vector. The introduction of 
marketing instruments ensures that 
journalists are no longer “the only 
audience of Europe” (Baisnée 2000; 
2002). 
 
In more than one respect, the EU’s 
theme of “institutional reform”, 
operating in the soon-to-be sanctioned 
concept of “European governance”38 and 
later in the draft Constitution adopted in 
2004, was an expression of the desire to 
reconcile the general public and Europe. 
By means of successive adjustments, the 
institutional reform was aimed at 
simplifying and therefore making the 
decision-making process of the EU more 
                                                
38 European Commission, White Paper on 
European governance, Brussels, European 
Commission, 2001 [COM(2001) 428 final]. 
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intelligible to a maximum number of 
people. This teaching of the institutional 
action is supposed to curb the increasing 
abstention and mistrust of citizens in 
“Brussels”. After the creation of the 
Common Market (1986-1992) which 
was characterised by increased 
Commission activity, in terms of 
constraining norms for Europeans, and 
the passage to a political Europe with the 
Maastricht Treaty, it became imperative 
to “democratise” institutional and 
decision-making mechanisms. The 
Maastricht Treaty immediately mentions 
that the “principle of representative 
democracy”39 is the model of 
institutional design of the EU and 
consequently strengthens the role of the 
European Parliament.40 Within this 
context of democratisation, the 
intergovernmental conference charged 
with adopting the new treaty included a 
series of requirements regarding 
transparency in the decision-making 
process, and the legibility of Community 
texts.41 It was followed in 1993 by an 
institutional declaration jointly signed by 
the Council, Parliament and the 
Commission; and held up as a necessary 
step forward for democracy which would 
promote greater transparency in the 
                                                
39 Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, article I-46. 
40 Especially, for example, by codifying the use 
of the Commission’s vote of investiture and the 
introduction of a co-decision procedure (jointly 
with Council) in matters of legislation.  
41 Declaration 17 of the IGC (1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty) amendment to the TEU states: “The 
Conference considers that transparency of the 
decision-making process strengthens the 
democratic nature of the institutions and the 
public's confidence in the administration. The 
Conference accordingly recommends that the 
Commission submit to the Council no later than 
1993 a report on measures designed to improve 
public access to the information available to the 
institutions”. Declaration 39 emphasises that: 
“The Conference notes that the quality of the 
drafting of Community legislation is crucial if it 
is to be properly implemented by the competent 
national authorities and better understood by the 
public and in business circles”.   
decision-making process, as well as 
clarify the restrictive conditions of 
applying the principle of subsidiarity.42 
The formal democratisation of the EU, 
reinforced by the provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty43 did not produce the 
desired effect on EU public opinion. The 
mediatisation of the scandal and 
resignation of the Santer Commission 
(March 1999) appeared as the symptoms 
of a deep crisis of confidence in the EU 
both on the part of the elites,44 
traditionally considered more amenable 
to Europe, and the citizens who have 
been staunch opponents of Europe since 
Maastricht.45 Even after its conversion to 
the “science” of communicational 
marketing, the diffusionist paradigm, 
like the action model that extended it, 
reached the limit of its effectiveness in 
the face of the EU’s “democratic 
deficit”. The challenge facing EU 
communication was no longer only a 
problem of popularity, in other words, 
popularising Europe, its history, and 
actions. It was more a problem of image, 
or softening negative perceptions about 
the EU. Indeed, public perception of 
Community action changed considerably 
in the period spanning from the Delors 
Plan to the resignation of the Santer 
Commission. The normative nature of 
                                                
42 Inter-institutional Declaration on Democracy, 
Transparency & Subsidiarity, Bulletin of 
European Communities, n°10, 1993. 
43 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) meets the 
urgent need to “democratise the EU” by adapting 
its institutions to enlargement and “bringing it 
closer to its citizens” as inscribed in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
44 On this point, see Meyer 1999. Regarding the 
resignation of the Santer Commission, 
Georgakakis shows that the outcome of the crisis 
can be understood in terms of “external” and 
“internal” factors. The weakening of the bonds 
between the Commission and accredited 
journalists, and the distancing of MEPs are 
“external”; while the breakdown in solidarity 
between the commissioners and their 
administration is “internal”. See Georgakakis 
2000. 
45 See Eurobarometer 42, autumn 1994. 
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the Commission’s work became more 
important to people than its distributive 
policies (structural funds, regional 
policies, CAP) (Scharpf 1999). Vilified 
endlessly by the growing mobilisation of 
Eurosceptics in public arenas, “Brussels” 
came to acquire the image of a distant 
bureaucratic, technocratic and 
interventionist “Hydra”.46 Being a new 
phenomenon at the time, Euroscepticism 
made waves not only in electoral debates 
and media platforms, but also in the 
political discourse of national 
governments. 
 
It was in this sombre atmosphere that the 
EU communication strategy was 
redesigned in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. The main principles of this new 
strategy consisted in greater accessibility 
to information on Europe, especially 
electronic, and presenting Europe as 
receptive to its citizens. By investing 
heavily in Internet, the Commission 
opted for participative structures, which 
are the showcase and concrete 
manifestation of a discourse espousing 
the virtues of open and transparent 
institutions that listen to citizens. This 
new paradigm, which can be said to be 
procedural, quickly spread throughout 
the institutional space of the Union like 
the new “European governance” and, by 
extension, a historic movement 
considered by some specialists as “the 
retreat of the interventionist doctrine” 
(see Magnette 2006: 213sq.). However, 
during the “crisis” of 2005 some 
                                                
46 Under the leadership of technocrats with no 
democratic legitimacy, the Commission was 
driven by a sheltered administrative spirit under 
the influence of lobbies. However, the 
Commission was not the only target of these 
constant criticisms expressed by the public. The 
European Parliament was also accused of being 
too technical, invisible and de-politicised. 
Finally, the Council was faulted for cultivating 
the art of secrecy, prejudicial to the principles of 
democratic publicity. See Mazey/Richardson 
1993.  
protagonists were tempted to radicalise 
this paradigm by extolling the 
supposedly democratic virtues of direct 
dialogue – with neither media nor 
mediators – with citizens. Although this 
contemporary communicational myth – 
whereby policy is no longer a rational 
process of agreement among experts 
(Neveu 1994: 31) but an egalitarian 
voicing of opinions on public problems – 
was able to seduce the current 
Commissioner for Communication, it 
met with stiff opposition from the other 
institutional partners.  
 
(2) The inescapable “democratic 
deficit”, or the hypochondria of 
European communication:  
Rejection and accommodations 
of the procedural paradigm. 
 
Communicating to re-enchant Europe 
 
The post-Santer era is characterised by 
the fluidity of the European institutional 
game. The Commission was 
permanently weakened by accusations of 
favouritism, fraud and nepotism, which 
finally forced the Santer Commission to 
resign in March 1999 before the censure 
of Parliament.47 Although the latter 
undeniably exerted its power in this 
unusual confrontation, its action 
paradoxically remained dependent on the 
initiatives of the Commission in 
accordance with the principles of the 
decision-making process. At a time 
when the various EU actors had to define 
the rules and routines governing the 
                                                
47 By the end of summer 1998, the Parliament 
was debating accusations of haphazard- if not 
fraudulent- management of the Commission’s 
contracts. The Community executive and the 
European Parliament appointed a “Committee of 
Sages” made up of five independent experts who 
submitted an alarming report on the management 
practices of some of the Commissioners. 
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system of institutional relations, 
communication became a sensitive point 
in their discussions. As part of the 
overhaul of the Commission’s 
administration recommended by the 
report from the “Committee of Sages”, 
Romano Prodi dissolved the DG-X soon 
after his commission took office in 
September 1999. President Prodi took 
the unprecedented step of attaching the 
“Media and Communications” portfolio 
to his own mandate,48 and shared the 
responsibilities of the erstwhile DG-X 
between the SPP, which was in charge of 
Media and Communication, and the DG-
Education-Culture, mainly in charge of 
opinion studies and publications. 
However, this administrative 
fragmentation of means, staff and 
interlocutors failed to satisfy the MEPs. 
An alarming rate of abstention in the 
European elections of 199949 was all it 
took for them to demand a more active 
communication that would re-assess the 
standing of “Europe” in the eyes of the 
general public prior to the switchover to 
the Euro and upcoming enlargement. 
More than ever, a new communication 
policy appeared to them as the means of 
countering the indifference, as well as 
the lack of interest in the EU on the part 
of Europeans (Meyer 1999).  
 
In response to the requests of the 
Parliament, the president made a 
commitment in Strasbourg during the 
parliamentary session of spring 2000, 
that the Commission would adopt “an 
information strategy” before the end of 
the year. However, as Prodi delayed in 
making good on his promise, in March 
                                                
48 Traditionally, Prodi’s official mandate also 
covers the General Secretariat and the Legal 
Department, which are transversal sectors of the 
Commission’s administration. 
49 Voter turnout at European elections has 
declined steadily since the first elections with 
universal suffrage: 63 % in 1979; 61% in 1984; 
58 % in 1989; 56.8 % in 1994; and only 49 % in 
1999.  
2001, MEPs adopted a “resolution on the 
information and communication strategy 
of the EU” in which they emphasised 
that the communications strategy of 
European institutions “must be urgently 
adapted”, and “note with concern that 
the distribution of responsibilities in the 
information policy sector is considerably 
slowing the adoption of decisions in the 
said sector”.50 A few weeks later, the 
DG-X was re-established under the name 
of DG-PRESS (for press and 
communication) and given to the 
Portuguese Commissioner, Antonio 
Vitorino, who was already in charge of 
Justice and Home Affairs. Mr. Vitorino 
began his task in a tense atmosphere in 
which the unease resulting from the 
crisis of confidence in the Union was 
further worsened by the Irish voters’ 
rejection of the Treaty of Nice.51 As 
early as the following June, the 
Commission adopted the 
recommendations made by the Vitorino 
team, and proposed “a new framework 
of cooperation for activities concerning 
the information and communication 
policy of the European Union”.52 The 
general spirit of this text was to redefine 
the design and implementation of EU 
communication through greater 
involvement of various European actors 
in the information-communication effort 
of the EU. The Parliament, and its 
information offices in the Member 
States, constituted consultative bodies 
(EU Economic and Social Council, 
Regions Committee), civil society 
organisations, and political parties. 
                                                
50 European Parliament, Proposed Resolution on 
information and communication policy of the 
EU, 8 March 2001 (B5-0174/2001). Proposal 
passed on 14 March (2001).  
51 A referendum on the Treaty of Nice was 
called in Ireland on 8 May 2001.  
52 European Commission, A new framework for 
co-operation on activities concerning the 
information and communication policy of the 
European Union, Brussels, European 
Commission, June 2001 (COM(2001)354 final).  
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Moreover, even States were duly 
designated as partners in an “open 
framework for co-operation” for a 
“concerted implementation of the 
information policies characterised by a 
management that is light, decentralised 
and the least bureaucratic possible”. This 
implicit reference to the new European 
governance that would be highlighted a 
month later in the White Paper53 marked 
the beginning of change in the 
institutional framework in which the 
problem was viewed. The diffusionist 
paradigm gave way, albeit without 
disappearing altogether, to a procedural 
paradigm whereby the attitudes of 
European institutions, and the 
mechanisms and modalities of 
interaction with citizens appear as a 
sovereign remedy to the ills of Europe 
and, by extension, to the gaping 
“democratic deficit”.  
 
Partnership as “good practice”, or 
communication in the prism of 
“governance”. 
 
In many respects, the Commission’s 
attempt to bring about general change at 
the end of the 1999-2000 crises, and by 
the same token its communication 
strategy, is placed within the modes of 
action of the deliberative shift. In the 
1990s, this turn gripped the institutions 
of political power in Europe one by one, 
obliging them to experiment with 
deliberative mechanisms, such as 
neighbourhood committees, citizen 
juries, and participative forums, which 
gave priority to citizens and concerned 
groups in terms of policy decision 
mechanism.54 Political sociologists, who 
have carefully observed this 
                                                
53 European Commission, White Paper on 
European Governance, Luxembourg, OPCE, 
2001 (COM(2001) 428 final). 
54 On the introduction of these arrangements in 
Europe, see Sintomer 2007.  
phenomenon, link the implementation of 
these procedures to the emergence of a 
new principle of justification of political 
decision and, by extension, 
legitimisation of official action supposed 
to tackle the crisis of representation in 
parliamentary democracies. This greater 
plurality of actors in the decision-making 
process had catchwords like 
transparency, deliberation, participation, 
consultation, listening, forum and, of 
course, the concept-word of governance, 
which subsumes all this new spirit of 
public action.55 Although an earlier 
manifestation of this was to be found in 
the 1993 Inter-institutional Declaration 
and in the theme of institutional reform, 
this procedural democratisation was 
largely put forward in the 2001 White 
Paper on governance and in subsequent 
official communications by the 
Commission (see Michel 2007). Under 
the progressive influence of the 
Commission’s senior officials and 
Commissioners from the countries with 
Nordic-style governments (Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Germany), these 
deliberative mechanisms were factored 
in to the administrative, institutional and 
communicational reform of the EU 
(Georgakakis 2000, Meyer 1999). The 
sudden enthusiasm of the European 
institutional actors for these procedures 
that promised a renewal of democratic 
life was the result of several years of 
mounting criticisms regarding Europe’s 
“legitimacy deficit” (Magnette 2003). 
Although in terms of democratic theory 
the analysis shows that the powers of the 
EU are limited (especially considering 
its own constraining means) and that 
                                                
55 This “new spirit of public action”, as termed 
by Loïc Blondiaux and Yves Sintomer (in 
reference to the “new spirit of capitalism” 
analysed by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello), 
is based on the idea of greater participation of 
non-political actors and ordinary citizens in the 
shaping of public policy and decisions 
(Blondiaux/Sintomer 2002).  
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they conform in all manners to the 
principles of traditional representative 
democracy (Moravscik 2003). 
Governance as a concept helps procure a 
concerted and “civil society-oriented” 
model of Community decision-making. 
By communicating on this point, the 
Commission sought to deflect criticisms 
about the technocratic single-mindedness 
plaguing Brussels. All the participative 
and deliberative mechanisms set up since 
the 1990s56 were characteristic of 
flexible, open and efficient proximity 
democracy; far removed from the 
“Hydra” of Brussels. In terms of 
“policy”, the Commission proposed 
giving concrete expression to this new 
cooperation by extending the scope of 
action of the Inter-institutional Group on 
Information (IGI), where political 
appointees and civil servants of the 
Commission and Parliament have been 
cooperating since 1995 in defining the 
priority campaigns of the EU in 
partnership with Member States.57 
Established for the purposes of debate 
and consultation, the IGI may in the long 
run be changed into an “institutional 
information agency”.58 This possibility 
of externalisation shows the EU 
government’s tendency to divide 
decision-making mechanisms and the 
institutional (e.g., conflicting 
jurisdictions, slow pace of 
communication and negotiation 
procedures) and political (e.g., the need 
for majority or super-majorities, pressure 
                                                
56 The Europe telephone hotline (later Europe 
Direct) was launched in 1999. It was portrayed 
as a “direct dialogue” for citizens and companies 
wishing to know the rights and opportunities 
conferred by the Union. 
57 PRINCE- a European citizen information 
program established in 1995 (but which extended 
the Priority Information Program initiated in the 
1980s) and subsequently reserved for 
enlargement in 2001, the Euro, the debate on the 
future of Europe and the creation of a new zone 
of freedom, security and justice. 
58 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation…, op. cit., p. 18. 
from public opinion) constraints 
(Everson/Majone 2001: 139sq). 
Nevertheless, although the Commission 
was weakened, it reasserted its 
institutional prerogatives – and by the 
same token, the more limitative 
prerogatives of the Parliament – in 
matters of communication. 
 
“The autonomy and integrity of all of the 
institutions is fully respected in the new 
framework. In particular, the European 
Commission is solely responsible for the 
communication and information activities 
relating to its exclusive authority, e.g. the 
right of initiative, the guardianship of the 
Treaty or the execution of the Budget 
under the control of the budgetary 
authority. The European Parliament, 
when acting in its role as legislator, as 
budgetary authority or as the democratic 
control authority, must have full 
independence to voice its opinion and its 
members to speak freely on any subject of 
their choice.”59 
 
According to the adherents of this model 
(which could arguably be called an 
ideology) of decision-making, 
“governance confers the double 
advantage of re-introducing new 
principles of order in the inter-
institutional space and theorising the 
modernity of European democracy. 
Consequently, official communications 
referred to a “new institutional culture” 
and a “change of communication 
culture”, while endlessly glorifying the 
formula of “participatory democracy”, 
which became the order of the day, 
sometimes to ridiculous proportions.60 
Explicitly based on five broad principles 
(openness, participation, responsibility, 
                                                
59 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation…, op. cit., p. 5. 
60 Throughout the forty pages of the White Paper 
on Governance, “dialogue” appears 18 times, 
“civil society” 21 times, “responsibility[ies]” 36 
times, and “citizens” 44 times. Cf. European 
Commission, White Paper on governance…, op. 
cit. 
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efficiency and coherence), “good 
governance” prescribes “good practices” 
as the vehicle for conveying this new 
spirit of partnership with the various 
associations and institutions that 
represent citizens. It is therefore not a 
question of creating direct relations with 
the latter but rather of initiating “a 
systematic dialogue with European and 
national associations of regional and 
local government while respecting 
constitutional and administrative 
arrangements”.61 
 
On the basis of the recommendations of 
the White Paper on governance, the 
Commission opened a debate in the fall 
of 2002 on its new “communication 
strategy for the EU” project by 
submitting it to the Council, the 
Parliament and institutionalised 
consultative bodies.62 In the 
memorandum on the actual 
implementation of the project he sent to 
the Commission, Commissioner Vitorino 
states: 
 
“In order to succeed, the information and 
communication strategy of the 
commission must be determined at the 
highest political level and must be based 
on political priorities. It cannot be 
deployed in the vacuum but placed on the 
contrary in the framework of a new 
culture which acknowledges the 
importance of communication. By taking 
control of its own image through the 
development and broadcast of messages 
and the planning of related activities (…), 
the Commission will give itself the means 
for implementing the new strategy”.63  
 
                                                
61 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation… op. cit.  
62 European Commission, An Information and 
Communication Strategy for the European 
Union, Brussels, European Union, 2002 
[COM(2002) 350 final/2]. 
63 DG PRESS, Memorandum to the Commission 
on the consequences for the Commission of the 
Information and Communication strategy for the 
EU, 2002 (SEC(2002)744/3), p. 7. 
To significantly encourage with “utmost 
coherence” the involvement of local and 
national authorities, the Commission 
recommended the installation of “a 
common system of reference for all 
institutions”. This consists of 
highlighting four themes that would 
serve as a “vital lead”.64 Fully anchored 
in the semantic universe of governance, 
this strategy is at the sole initiative and 
exclusive responsibility of the 
Commission. Nevertheless, the 
Commission systematically consults 
political instances and other instituted 
groups in their capacity as “partners”, 
i.e., actors in developing the 
communication policy. However, for 
reasons that will be explained hereafter, 
the design of the policy in this area 
gradually turned into an arrangement for 
direct interface with citizens after 2004. 
This penchant for a radical version of the 
procedural paradigm was quickly 
opposed by the adherents of 
representative and vertical democracy, 
who felt their traditional role as 
mediators was being questioned. 
 
From participatory turn to “radical 
transition” 
 
In spite of the frequent disagreements 
that have characterised the inter-
institutional discussions on 
communication policy since the 1960s, 
the Commission has always obtained at 
least the tacit support of the other bodies 
at the top of the institutional triangle. 
The representatives of the States, who 
for so long had been unwilling to 
embrace any policy directed at their 
                                                
64 The virtue of exchanges (freedoms, diversity, 
humanism); value added in terms of efficiency 
and solidarity; the notion of protection; and the 
role of Europe in the world. Cf. European 
Commission, An Information and 
Communication Strategy for the European 
Union… op. cit., p. 12. 
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constituents, quickly chose to maintain a 
vigilant silence over these issues.65 The 
Parliament, which has always espoused a 
more voluntarist attitude, as expressed 
through resolutions (1981, 1993 and 
2001) or reports (Schuijt in 1979, Baget 
Bozzo in 1986), unfailingly associated 
itself with the work of the Commission, 
endeavouring to influence it. In the 
matter of European Union 
communication, there was equally a 
certain culture of compromise resulting 
from the euphemisation of polemics and 
the glossing over of officially exchanged 
texts.66 Over the last three years, 
however, this modus vivendi has given 
way to unusually frank exchanges, 
particularly between the Parliament and 
the Commission. After the record 
abstention in the European elections of 
200467 and the rejection of the draft 
constitution by French and Dutch voters, 
the Council of June 2005 invited EU 
institutional actors to a “period of 
reflections leading to a wide debate” on 
the future of the EU. The Commission 
was given the mission to lead a 
                                                
65 This attitude of the Council (and thus of the 
Member States) towards the SPI and 
DG Information-Communication has been 
explained in the same terms by several senior 
officials. Incidentally, their point of view 
confirms the testimony of J.-R. Rabier (Director 
of the SPI from 1960-1967, then Director 
General of the DG-X from 1970-1973), when he 
told the story of his career to Yves Conrad and 
Julie Cailleau in 2004 as part of the 
CONSHIST.COM program (Internal History of 
the European Commission 1958-1973). Cf. The 
Oral History Project, Historical Archives of the 
European Union, European University Institute. 
66 An examination of the reports of meetings 
between principal secretaries explicitly shows 
the willingness “to render some wordings 
neutral”. On the institutional glossing over of 
texts, see Ollivier-Yaniv/Oger 2006.  
67 Abstention reached 60% in the older Member 
States (54% in Spain, 57% in France and 
Germany, 61% in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom), and sometimes more than 70% in the 
new Member States (71% Czech Republic, 73% 
in Estonia, 79% in Poland and 83% in Slovakia). 
“mobilising debate” on Europe in 
Europe.68 Very quickly, members of the 
new Barroso Commission responded to 
this request by adopting an Action Plan 
for improving communication on 
Europe.69 The following July, the 
Commission adopted a program of 
reforms aimed at professionalising and 
decentralising communication services.70 
In autumn, Commissioner Wallström 
launched a series of debates and 
consultations throughout the EU referred 
to as “Plan D”.71 The goal was to 
redesign the contours of the 
communication policy of the Union 
through participatory debates. In 
February 2006, the White Paper on 
Communication was published. Both in 
terms of design (borrowed from 
participatory democracy) and objectives, 
successive initiatives of the Commission 
                                                
68 The terms chosen by the Heads of State during 
this invitation are indicative of the issues of 
perception of the institutional framework: “We 
have noted the outcome of the referendums in 
France and the Netherlands. We consider that 
these results do not call into question citizens' 
attachment to the construction of Europe. 
Citizens have nevertheless expressed concerns 
and worries which need to be taken into account. 
Hence, the need for us to reflect together on this 
situation. This period of reflection will be used to 
enable a broad debate to take place in each of our 
countries, involving citizens, civil society, social 
partners, national parliaments and political 
parties. This debate, designed to generate 
interest, which is already under way in many 
Member States, must be intensified and 
broadened. The European institutions will also 
have to make their contribution, with the 
Commission playing a special role in this 
regard”. (The European Council, 16-17 June 
2005, Brussels, Declaration on the Ratification 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the 
Europe, SN 117/05). 
69 European Commission, Action Plan to 
Improve Communicating Europe by the 
Commission, European Commission (ed.) 
Brussels July 2005.  
70 Ibid. 
71 European Commission, The Commission’s 
Contribution to the Period of Reflection and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate, Luxembourg, OPCE, 2005. 
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decoupled the procedural paradigm from 
haphazard experimentations, thus 
making it the basis for European 
communication and, ultimately, 
modifying the principle of legitimation 
of EU government. From the Action 
Plan of July 2005, there was talk of a 
“new approach” to communication on 
the basis of permanent direct debate 
between European institutions and 
citizens based on three principles: 
“- Listening: communication is a 
dialogue, not a one-way street. It is not 
just about EU institutions informing EU 
citizens but also about citizens expressing 
their opinions so that the Commission can 
understand their perceptions and 
concerns. Europe's citizens want to make 
their voices in Europe heard and their 
democratic participation should have a 
direct bearing on EU policy formulation 
and output. 
– Communicating: EU policies and 
activities, as well as their impact on 
everyday lives, have to be communicated 
and advocated in a manner that people 
can understand and relate to if citizens 
are to follow political developments at 
European level.  
– Connecting with citizens by “going 
local”: Good communication requires 
excellent understanding of local 
audiences. The Commission’s 
communication activities must be 
resourced and organised in such a way as 
to address matching demographic and 
national and local concerns, and to 
convey information through the channels 
citizens prefer in the language they can 
understand.”72 
The plan makes apoint of specifically 
detailing the rationalisation and 
professionalisation of communications 
activities within the various Community 
departments. On a political level, the 
pivotal and centralising role of the 
Commission was considerably 
                                                
72 European Commission, Action Plan, op. cit., 
p. 3. 
strengthened. The Commission thus 
showed a “single face” and facilitated a 
better use of communication tools and 
services. The Commissioners, who are 
the “public faces”, were encouraged to 
visit and communicate in Member States 
more often, as they were not only the 
“main communicators” but also the 
“most effective communicators” of the 
Commission. The Commission’s 
representatives (attached to the DG in 
charge of communication) in Member 
States were urged to improve their role 
as “ambassadors” and “spokespersons” 
with the media and public opinion. At 
the administrative level, the fight against 
the persistent “fragmentation of 
communication activities” demanded a 
massive reorganisation of the 
communication machinery of the EU. 
This involved the true 
professionalisation of officials in charge 
of this policy, i.e., their access to 
specialised information and recruitment 
of communication specialists. 
Professionalisation also demanded better 
coordination of the communication 
departments of the various DGs. They 
therefore proposed that the DG-PRESS 
solely assume full responsibility for co-
ordination. It was re-named DG-COMM 
to “take into account the global character 
of the new approach to communication” 
and “assume the new responsibility”. 
This responsibility includes planning and 
assessment of the EU communication 
policy, in addition to its traditional roles 
of analysing European public opinion 
and monitoring the media. Under the 
leadership of the Commissioner in 
charge of communication, the “group of 
Commission members in charge of 
communication and programming” 
defined common “priorities” and 
“agenda” for communication. Equally in 
connection with the development of a 
common message, “all information 
relays financed by the Commission were 
placed under a limited number of 
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regulatory bodies, sometimes one or two, 
depending on the target audience, such 
as companies or the general public”.  
 
 
The strengthening of the co-ordinating 
role of the Commission was in 
conjunction with the promotion of direct 
links between the Commission and 
European citizens. As seen in the Action 
Plan, the Internet was presented as the 
preferred tool of the new communication 
strategy. Referring to Europa.eu, the 
Internet portal of the EU – said to be 
“the world’s biggest public Internet site” 
– the plan announced new progress in 
the electronic interface with citizens, 
which came as a result from the 
appointment of an Europa editor and the 
creation of a “news site”. Europa has 
interactive arrangements which allow for 
accessing personalised information,73 
expressing points of view on Community 
policies74 and accessing the 
Commissioners’ personal blogs. 
Europa.eu was portrayed as a tool for 
engaging “dialogue” and “debate” with 
citizens. Adopted by the Commission a 
few months later and presented as “the 
contribution of the Commission to the 
period of reflection and beyond”, Plan 
                                                
73 Launched in 1999, the Europe telephone 
hotline - later known as Europe Direct- helped 
to directly solicit information from European 
institutions. Questions can be asked by 
telephone (the number redirects the call to the 
Commission’s representations in the caller’s 
country), or on europa.eu.int/europedirect/. 
Eurojus is a similar program meant for legal 
issues. 
74 In this regard, see the programs: Your voice 
and Interactive Policy Making, which are aimed 
at helping European institutions “understand the 
needs of citizens and enterprises better”. It is 
intended to “assist policy development by 
allowing more rapid and targeted responses to 
emerging issues and problems, improving the 
assessment of the impact of policies (or the 
absence of them) and providing greater 
accountability to citizens”, (Europa.ec.). 
D75 was designed to “initiate a wide and 
intensive debate on EU policies. 
However, it was much more ambitious 
than a cycle of debates over Europe in 
the Member States and on the Internet. 
Moreover, the Commission described it 
as “a long-term program aimed at 
revitalising European democracy and 
contributing to the emergence of a 
European public sphere, within which 
citizens would receive the information 
and tools they need to actively 
participate in the decision-making 
process and to appropriate the European 
Project”.76 Thus, as part of the direct 
consequences of the principles 
enunciated in the White Paper on 
governance, there is a clear link between 
interactive communication procedures 
and legitimacy of the political system. It 
is the radicalisation of this approach in 
the White Paper on Communication 
(February 2006), which drew opposition 
to the Commission’s attempt to 
concentrate the initiative and 
management of EU communication. 
 
The black legend of the White Paper 
 
Originally scheduled to be released in 
the autumn of 2006, the conclusions of 
the Commission on the responses to its 
proposals were published more than one 
year later in October 2007.77 These 
                                                
75 European Commission, The Commission’s 
Contribution to the Period of Reflection and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate, Luxembourg, 2005 [COM(2005) 494 
final]. 
76 Ibid., p. 3. 
77 Published in February 2006, the WPC 
announced a six-month period of consultation 
with official institutions and bodies, as well as all 
“interested parties” (“NGOs, corporate 
associations” and other “special interests 
groups”) through “a series of consultative 
forums”. The White Paper stipulates: “At the end 
of this period, the Commission will summarise 
the replies and draw conclusions with a view to 
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scheduling problems explain the 
reception given to the “basically new 
approach” to communication as 
proposed in the text. A close 
examination of previous information and 
communication policies reveals that the 
White Paper on Communication 
represents a paradigm shift both in terms 
of designs and practices of the past. The 
remote hope of the media acting as 
mediators of a transnational Europe was 
explicitly jettisoned in favour of direct 
forms of information based on 
organisational networks, such as 
representations and Internet services and 
portals. The Commission equally 
abandoned the old dream of a European 
public opinion, replacing it with a 
pragmatic strategy supposed to shape a 
“European public opinion” within local 
and national spaces. As a matter of form, 
both the arrangements and the formulas 
proposed in the White Paper on 
Communication clearly demonstrate a 
willingness to transpose participatory 
marketing technologies into political 
discourse (e.g., quality forums on brand 
sites, consumer blogs, and “one-to-one” 
communication). This is similar to the 
introduction of commercial 
communication methods in the 1990s, 
such as organisational marketing 
methods, preparing and broadcasting 
messages in the mass media. Although 
the white paper was officially aimed at 
“improving civic education”, it views 
citizens as consumers. As such, the 
political supply must relate to their 
expectations, opinions, and behaviour.78 
Based on the observations of the 
Eurobarometer, the White Paper on 
                                                
proposing plans of action for each working area”. 
(WPC, p. 3). 
78 As from the late 1990s, and more 
systematically after 2001, the Commission 
sponsored “qualitative” opinion studies based on 
the focus group method. On the construction of a 
social demand through political instruments, see 
the introduction in Anquetin/Freyermuth 2008.  
 
Communication considers 
communication as a regulatory 
instrument that helps reduce the apparent 
paradox of maintaining on the one hand, 
positive attitudes vis-à-vis Europe; and, 
on the other hand, the increasing 
abstention and mistrust of Europe from 
citizens. The novelty here lies in the 
highly instrumental conception of the 
propositions designed to “bring about a 
more effective participation of the media 
in communication relating to Europe”. 
Indeed, the White Paper on 
Communication encouraged public 
bodies on European, national and local 
levels to “supply the media with high 
quality information and current affairs 
material” and “work more closely with 
broadcast houses and the media”, and 
“create new links with regional and local 
communication systems” (p.10). In its 
desire to improve upon available tools, 
the White Paper also proposed the 
“modernisation of Europe by Satellite 
(EbS)”, a service which provides 
journalists with free pictures of EU 
activities, “with a focus on producing 
high quality audiovisual content which is 
user-friendly for the media and relevant 
to the citizens, and to explore the 
desirability of having an inter-
institutional service operating on the 
basis of professional standards” (Ibid.). 
 
In what constitutes a fundamentally new 
approach, the White Paper states: “a 
decisive move away from one-way 
communication to reinforced dialogue, 
from an institution-centred to a citizen-
centred communication”. Arguing 
incontestably that “peoples’ support for 
the European Project is a matter of 
common interest”, the Commission 
states that “communication should 
become an EU policy in its own right, at 
the service of the citizens” (p.4). 
Furthermore, one of the strongest 
proposals in the White Paper was to 
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formally define a single framework for 
EU communication: 
 
“The common principles and norms that 
should guide information and 
communication activities on European 
issues could be enshrined in a framework 
document – for example a European 
Charter or Code of Conduct on 
Communication. The aim would be to 
engage all actors (EU institutions, 
national, regional and local governments, 
non-governmental organisations) in a 
common commitment to respecting these 
principles and ensure that EU 
communication policy serves the citizens’ 
interest. This commitment would be made 
on a voluntary basis. The Commission 
will launch a special web-based citizens’ 
forum to seek views on the desirability, 
purpose and content of such a framework 
document” (p.6) 
 
This proposal constitutes a double-break 
from the traditional institutional 
compromise of European 
communication: first, because it 
foreshadows a hardening of the 
standards binding the various European 
actors charged with communicating with 
the public and the media; and, second, 
because it imposes the principle of 
publicity, giving citizens the possibility 
to make their voices heard during 
interinstitutional discussions. The 
centralising, restricting and “proactive” 
nature of the Commission’s proposals 
departs considerably from existing inter-
institutional routine and compromise and 
accounts for the severity of the criticisms 
levelled at the White Paper. The first 
reactions came from journalists. 
Immediately after the presentation of the 
White Paper, the president of the 
International Press Association, Michaël 
Stabenow, expressed his “concern” in a 
letter to Mrs. Wallström in which he 
pointed out that “the replacement of EBS 
with a news agency would jeopardise the 
distribution of our respective 
jurisdictions”.79 In the face of the 
massive criticism and disquiet caused by 
the White Paper, the DG-COMM 
quickly posted online further 
explanations meant to be reassuring. In 
this communication exercise, the 
questions raised by the officials 
themselves are an indication of the 
general upheaval generated by the 
proposals of the White Paper.80 
 
After several months of debate by the 
Committees, the Parliament issued an 
official response which confirmed the 
hostile reception given to the White 
Paper in Community circles. MEPs have 
expressed their reticence in the report 
submitted by the Culture and Education 
Commission and adopted by Parliament 
in October 2006.81 The political 
importance of communication was made 
obvious through their recommendations, 
slightly “rectifying” the logics and 
                                                
79 Cf., « Nouvelle stratégie de la Commission 
pour expliquer l’Europe. Les associations de 
journalistes reprochent à Bruxelles de vouloir 
compliquer leur travail d'information », 
Le Monde, 5 février 2006. 
80 Here are a few selected questions: Does 
action not speak louder than words? Is the term 
communication not just a new word for EU 
propaganda? Why should regional and local 
authorities make Europe known? Surely, that is 
not their responsibility. The white paper talks 
about collaboration with the media. Does that 
mean that the Commission wants to control what 
the media says? What does the White Paper 
mean by “ modernising” Europe by Satellite 
service? The White Paper talks about 
a “charter” or “code of conduct” on European 
communication. Does it mean Brussels is going 
to impose new rules? Does the Commission want 
existing media, parliaments and educational 
systems at national level to be replaced by a 
“public sphere”? 
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_pa
per/question_answer/index_fr.htm.  
81 European Parliament, Report of the Committee 
on Culture and Education on the White Paper on 
a European communication policy (rapporteur: 
Luis Herrero-Tejedor) 16 October 2006 (A6-
0365/2006). Hereafter referred to as EP/WPC. 
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rhetoric of the White Paper. First of all, 
the role of communication was put into 
perspective in relation to the effects of 
public policies themselves: “…better 
communication cannot compensate for 
insufficient policies but can improve the 
understanding of conducted policies”, 
states the rapporteur who, “welcomes the 
Commission's recognition of the fact that 
communication can never be divorced 
from what is being communicated”, in 
this case, the policies themselves. 
However, the MEPs’ tone quickly turned 
into one of warning, when they “urged 
the Commission to support the creation 
of a European public sphere” and not to 
leave information about Europe to the 
exclusive care of local and international 
media, but to work with them “as 
intermediaries, opinion-makers, and 
carriers of messages to the citizen in the 
European public sphere”. In this regard, 
they demanded greater efficiency and 
less bureaucracy from the “myriads” of 
information centres. They also urged the 
Commission not to overestimate the 
participatory role of citizens with regard 
to available information about Europe, 
encouraging it to keep the programs and 
communication support which convey, 
with loyal support of governments, this 
information to the citizens: 
 
“The idea of citizens becoming drivers of 
participation and dialogue does not seem 
reasonable, since it is not citizens who 
should seek out information, but rather 
information that should seek out the 
citizens. (EP/WPC, p.5) National 
politicians often taking credit for 
European success stories, while, 
conversely, being quick to criticise the 
EU, often for failures in policy that arise 
at national level” (Ibid., p.5) 
 
This is a thinly veiled disavowal of the 
logic of participatory democracy 
proposed by the Commission, and by the 
same token, a preference for a more 
functional representative democracy in 
which each institution must preserve its 
independence and assume the 
responsibilities conferred by its own 
legitimacy.  The “code of good 
conduct”, supposed substitute to 
legitimacy based on the clarification of 
the “legal basis” for the information 
policy, was thus rejected. 
 
“The Commission has proposed to 
establish a code of conduct on 
communication, that is to say, to draw up 
common rules for the European 
institutions, national bodies, and so forth, 
thereby laying foundations on which to 
cement communication policies. The 
rapporteur considers that this idea is not 
only fundamentally mistaken, but also 
undesirable to the extent that it would 
create a poor substitute for a genuine 
legal basis. In point of fact the European 
institutions have no legal basis for 
Community reports given over specifically 
to information and communication. As a 
result the Commission too often lays itself 
open to the charge of meddling in an area 
outside its responsibility or even of 
disseminating propaganda. The best way 
to avoid this pitfall, however, is not to 
base a communication policy on a code of 
conduct, but to seek a unanimous decision 
of the Member States in the European 
Council, thereby affording a means, 
under Article 308 of the Treaty, to provide 
a legal basis in the full sense.” (EP/WPC, 
p. 12) 
 
By repositioning the problem within the 
legal framework of inter-institutional 
relations, the EP/WPC recalls not only 
the independence of each institution in 
terms of communication policy, but also 
the need “to enhance existing 
mechanisms for inter-institutional 
partnership”. This is a very explicit way 
of criticising the functioning of the IGI 
and reaffirming the need for the 
Commission to work in consultation 
with other actors in the EU decision-
making process.  In effect, it is a 
confrontation between two schools of 
thought: on one side is the WPC, which 
supposedly overestimates the role of 
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communication in solving the political 
problems of Europe and encourages the 
promotion of participatory democracy 
under the headship of the Commission. 
On the other side are MEPs who advance 
the time-tested virtues of representative 
democracy. By bringing the issue of 
“legal basis” for communication to the 
negotiation table, the Parliament was 
proposing an inter-institutional 
alternative to the Commission’s 
normative proposals. In many respects, 
the WBC, by virtue of its formal and 
public nature, re-crystallises a long-
standing point of disagreement between 
the two institutions; namely the concept 
of communication as a tool of political 
legitimisation. Championed by elected 
representatives, i.e., executives of 
national parties well-versed in the 
territorialised exercise of political 
mandate, the regulatory vision of 
communication as a vehicle of political 
consent82 was a strange bedfellow of the 
procedural approach espoused by the 
Commission. This incompatibility was 
all the more enhanced by the fact that, in 
radicalising this approach, the 
Commission tended to marginalise, if 
not sideline, the role of traditional media 
and mediators, like elected 
representatives and civil society 
organisations. 
 
It is the same fear of relegation of civil 
society organisations which underpins 
the criticisms expressed by the European 
Economic and Social Committee.83 Both 
in its arguments and recommended 
solutions, the Committee’s stand was 
very close to that of the Parliament 
regarding the pursuit of inter-
                                                
82 On “the institutional economy of consent”, see 
Gaïti 2006.  
83 Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the White Paper on a European 
communication policy, 
Official Journal of the European Union, 16 
December 2006 (2006/C 309/24). 
institutional co-operation and the 
mediation work of the representatives: 
 
“The Committee, which strongly supports 
a decentralised approach, would urge the 
Commission to reflect further on how 
genuine synergies and interinstitutional 
cooperation may be facilitated at the 
decentralised level. The White Paper 
states that at the end of the consultation 
period, the Commission will ‘present the 
results of the consultation and then 
consider whether to propose a Charter, a 
Code of Conduct or other instrument.’ 
The Committee is concerned by this 
language and sees risks in what would 
appear to be the potential approach the 
Commission might propose. The 
Committee notes with concern the 
Commission's launching of a special web-
based forum to seek views on the 
desirability of such a framework 
document. Not all European citizens have 
access to such a web-based approach. It 
would be essential to back up the 
consultation exercise through other, more 
traditional media.”84 
 
The proposal making communication “a 
European policy in its own right”, 
coupled with the desire to establish a 
“charter”, was tantamount to putting the 
Commission in control of the means, and 
the driving, of the communication 
policy; thus reducing the latitude of the 
other partners in terms of being 
consulted and, in the case of Parliament, 
the voting for the budget. The quarrel 
over the “legal basis” for the 
communication policy would therefore 
crystallise opposition towards the WPC. 
Contrary to the Commission’s often 
repeated claim to “exclusive authority” 
on the issue (linked to its right of 
initiative and to its role of custodian of 
the treaty, see above), MEPs claimed 
that the sharing of powers in terms of 
communication has never been clearly 
defined within the EU. A note posted on 
                                                
84 Ibid. pp.1-2. 
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the Parliament’s official website in 
January 2007 read: 
“Legal basis for Communication Policy: 
Articles 21, 195, 211 and 308 of the EC 
treaty. Articles 11, 41, 42 and 44 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. The Treaty of Rome and 
the Amsterdam Treaty do not contain any 
particular chapter or article concerning 
communication policy. At present the 
EU's communication policy is based on 
the articles of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Article 11 (right to information 
and freedom of expression, as well as 
freedom and diversity of the media), 
Article 41 (right to be heard and right of 
access to documents relating to oneself), 
Article 42 (right of access to the 
documents of the European Institutions) 
and Article 44 (right of petition). For 
actions for which there is no separate 
legal basis in the EC Treaty, a reference 
to Article 308 of the EC Treaty (extension 
of competence) is necessary.”85 
For many months, the legal and political 
controversy surrounding the “legal 
basis” of communication was the subject 
of negotiations, albeit much less 
publicised than the Commissioned had 
originally hoped. As a follow-up to the 
WPC,86 the Commission published a text 
whose objective was to bring an end to 
the controversy87 by drastically reducing 
the number of proposals made by the 
Commission eighteen months earlier. It 
was a shift away from the approach 
championed in the WPC, which consists 
of adjusting communication to the public 
through a “process of listening to 
citizens” by means of local debates (with 
                                                
85 Fact sheet on communication policy, available 
at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4_16_7_en.
htm. 
86 European commission, Communicating 
Europe in Partnership, OPCE, October 3 2007 
(COM(2007)569). 
87 On the day the commission published its 
proposals resulting from the “consultation” 
around the WPC, Commissioner Wallström 
released a press statement titled, “Stop the Blame 
Game!”. 
increased use of representations in 
Member States), and qualitative opinion 
sampling arrangements and studies. 
Although the earlier participatory streak 
still features among the “concrete 
proposals” formulated by the 
Commission, the obvious objective was 
“greater co-operation and collaboration 
between EU institutions; and bodies and 
the Member States and association of 
these partners with the process of 
communicating on European issues”. 
The inter-institutional agreement was 
presented to the public as a means of 
enhancing the “co-ordination of the 
communication activities of the various 
EU actors” and, basically, the solution to 
the conflict resulting from the 
Commission’s attempt to regain control 
of communication policy and the 
common means thereof.  In reality, 
though, it is a return to the principles of 
partnership (with institutions and bodies 
as well as States and local actors) 
adopted in 2001 and 2002 (see above). 
Basically, it is an extension of the 
PRINCE program, and the strengthening 
of its pilot committee (GH). The draft 
interinstitutional agreement drawn up by 
the Commission - and favourably 
received by the other signatory 
institutions (Council and Parliament) – 
signalled the decline of both the 
centralising pretensions and the 
participatory model initially advanced by 
the Commission. 
 
“1. Information and communication on 
European issues should pursue the 
following objectives: 
– To give everyone access to fair and 
diverse information about the European 
Union; 
– To enable everyone to exercise their 
right to express their views and to 
participate actively in the public debate 
on European issues. All public actors in 
the European Union have a responsibility 
to pursue these objectives, observing the 
principles of inclusiveness and pluralism, 
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participation and empowerment, openness 
and transparency. 
 
2. While recognising the different 
responsibilities of each EU institution, 
this Interinstitutional Agreement 
highlights the need for and the added 
value of better coordination in the way 
EU institutions and bodies communicate 
on EU issues. It provides a framework for 
coordinated action to this end. 
 
3. Together with the EU institutions and 
bodies, Member States have an essential 
role to play in disseminating information 
on EU issues at national, regional and 
local level in order to reach out to as 
many citizens as possible.”88 
 
The debate among the major EU 
institutional actors over the WPC 
between early 2006 and late 2007 
heralded the end of consensus over the 
aims of EU communication policy. By 
proposing to break with inter-
institutional routine89 and reinforce the 
common constraint, Mrs. Wallström 
distanced herself from the habitual 
transversal role (Smith 2001) of 
Commissioners in the institutional 
triangle90 in terms of preparing the 
Commission’s proposals. The epilogue 
to this intra-Community conflict marks 
the return of European communication to 
the time-tested model of European 
consensus, akin to the Co-decision 
                                                
88 European Commission, Proposal For An 
Inter-Institutional Agreement On 
Communicating Europe In Partnership, 
Commission Working Document, October 2007. 
89 A few days before the presentation of the 
WPC, Heads of Cabinet various Commissioners 
had “withheld judgement” regarding portions of 
the WPC that mentioned “a charter or code of 
conduct”, and the modernisation of EbS. See 
Report of the special meeting of chiefs of staff 
on January 26 2006 on the White Paper on a 
European communication policy. 
(SEC(2006)129). 
90 Our sources indicate that top officials of the 
DG-COMM did not support the “coup de force” 
staged by Wallström and her cabinet in 
announcing a new European communication 
policy.   
Procedure. In its relations with the public 
in Member States, the EU remains 
confined to its “diffuse democracy” 
(Lequesne/Costa/Jabko/Magnette 2003) 
perimeter, compelled to compromise 
with Member States and actors of the 
European Project. In the EU, which is a 
“regulatory state” of European societies 
(Majone 1996), the weightiness of the 
logics of compromise has imperceptibly 
prevailed over the Commission’s 
attempts to make a Community policy 
out of communication, and confined its 
competences in that field to the co-
ordination of the respective interests of 
EU institutions.
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